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This paper provides a beginning study of the effects on inductive
inference of paradigm shifts whose absence is approximately modeled
by various formal approaches to forbidding large changes in the size of
programs conjectured. One approach, called severely parsimonious,
requires all the programs conjectured on the way to success to be nearly
(i.e., within a recursive function of) minimal size. It is shown that this
very conservative constraint allows learning infinite classes of func-
tions, but not infinite r.e. classes of functions. Another approach, called
non-revolutionary, requires all conjectures to be nearly the same size as
one another. This quite conservative constraint is, nonetheless, shown
to permit learning some infinite r.e. classes of functions. Allowing up to
one extra bounded size mind change towards a final program learned
certainly does not appear revolutionary. However, somewhat sur-
prisingly for scientific (inductive) inference, it is shown that there are
classes learnable with the non-revolutionary constraint (respectively,
with severe parsimony), up to (i+1) mind changes, and no anomalies,
which classes cannot be learned with no size constraint, an unbounded,
finite number of anomalies in the final program, but with no more than
i mind changes. Hence, in some cases, the possibility of one extra mind
change is considerably more liberating than removal of very conser-
vative size shift constraints. The proofs of these results are also
combinatorially interesting. ] 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
1. INTRODUCTION
The present paper is a beginning study of the
phenomenon of paradigm shift (see Kuhn [26]) in the con-
text of machine inductive learninginference. The issues are
difficult to formalize directly mathematically, so instead of
tackling them directly, we take an indirect approach and
investigate the effects on induction of disallowing certain
formalizable kinds of paradigm shift. A number of mathe-
matical formulations that capture some interesting notions
of paradigm shift are proposed. The induction task we chose
for this investigation is the identification of computer
programs for computable functions from their graphs.1
A paradigm shift is usually associated with a significant
conceptual change in the hypothesis conjectured by the
‘‘learner.’’ Conceptual change (significant or otherwise) is
difficult to formalize rigorously. A possible, though overly
simple expectation is that a significant conceptual change in
hypotheses is also accompanied by a significant change in
the size of the hypotheses. Thus, keeping learners from con-
jecturing hypotheses of extreme variation in size may be
seen as disallowing a kind of paradigm shift. This forms the
basis of our beginning attempt herein to model induction
without paradigm shifts.
Learning machines may be thought of as Turing machines
computing a mapping from ‘‘finite sequences of data’’ into
computer programs. A typical variable for learning
machines is M. A function learning machine may be thought
of as a learning machine that at any given time, takes an
initial segment of the graph of a function as input2 and out-
puts (the index of ) a computer program in some fixed
acceptable programming system [36, 28, 38]. We now
describe what it means for such a machine to learn a function.
Let N denote the set of natural numbers. Let R denote the
set of all computable functions (i.e., the set of partial com-
putable functions that are total) with arguments and values
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1 Several papers in computational learning theory, which investigate
identification of computer programs for computable functions, have
already provided explicit insights into inductive inference in science (see,
for example, [33, 6, 15, 12, 2, 11, 21, 27]).
2 For each of the criteria of successful learning studied in this paper, it is
easy to show that, without loss of generality, the graphs of the (total) func-
tion inputs can be received in standard order.
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from N. The following definition is essentially Gold’s [22]
criterion for successful identification of functions by learn-
ing machines.
Definition 1 [22].
(a) M Ex-identifies f # R just in case M, successively fed
initial segments of f of increasing length, converges to an
index of a program for f. In this case we say that f # Ex(M).
(b) Ex denotes the collection of all classes S of com-
putable functions such that some machine Ex-identifies
each function in S.
Ex is a set theoretic summary of the capability of single
machines to Ex-identify classes of functions. In the sequel,
we will refer to ‘‘an index of a program’’ as ‘‘a program.’’
As noted, in the present study, we will approximately
model disallowing paradigm shift in terms of restrictions
regarding the size of a machine’s conjectures on the graph of
a function. It is instructive, then, to review studies of size
restriction on hypotheses in the inductive inference
literature. These studies have been motivated by a desire to
model Occam’s Razor3a heuristic about the desirability of
parsimony in explanations.
The study of size restriction on hypotheses requires that
we clarify the notion of size of hypotheses. Since hypotheses
conjectured by learning machines are computer programs,
any size measure that satisfies Blum’s [8] axioms for size
measures suffices. It is easy to see that one of the simplest
size measures satisfying Blum’s axioms is the index of
the program. We present our results in the context of this
simple size measure. We note, however, that all the results
described in the present paper hold for any Blum size
measure. The choice of index of program as the size measure
is motivated by its simplicity and its use in earlier studies of
program size restrictions in machine induction.
Freivalds [17] was the first to consider a criterion of suc-
cess in which a learning machine was required to conjecture
the minimal size program for the function being identified.
Unfortunately, this criterion of success turned out to be
mathematically problematical since the collections of func-
tions that could be identified according to this criterion
were dependent on the acceptable programming system
used to interpret a learner’s conjectures. More precisely, he
showed that there are acceptable programming systems in
which only finite classes of computable functions can be
minimally identified and other acceptable systems in which
infinite classes of computable functions can be so identified.
Freivalds [17] relaxed the stringent minimality require-
ment to introduce a criterion of success called nearly mini-
mal identification according to which a learner need con-
verge only to a program for the function whose size is within
a computable ‘‘fudge factor’’ of the minimal size program for
the function. This criterion, called herein MEx and which is
acceptable programming system independent4, turned out to
be a useful notion and was extended in Chen [16] to
include the case of anomalies in the final hypothesis (see
[24] for extension of Freivalds’ and Chen’s work to
language identification). However, it is easy to see that
nearly minimal identification does not provide a suitable
model for inference without paradigm shift because,
although there is a size restriction placed on the final
hypothesis, a learner is free to conjecture hypotheses of
arbitrary size before the onset of convergence.5 Addressing
this objection yields our first model of induction without
paradigm shift. This formulation, referred to as severely par-
simonious identification, requires not only that a learner
conjecture a final program that is within a computable
fudge factor of minimal size, but all its conjectures on the
function being identified be within that computable fudge
factor of minimal size. We clarify this notion in the next
definition.
Definition 2. (a) M is severely parsimonious on a
collection of functions S just in case there exists a com-
putable function h such that, for each f # S, M, on initial
segments of f, outputs only programs that are of size no
greater than h(minimal size program for f ).
(b) SpEx denotes the set of collections S of functions
such that there exists a machine that is severely par-
simonious on S and that Ex-identifies S.
A somewhat stronger requirement in which the learner
behaves severely parsimoniously on every computable func-
tion is referred to as globally severely parsimonious iden-
tification. The class gSpEx is defined to be the collection of
sets of functions, S, such that there exists a machine that is
severely parsimonious on every computable function and
that Ex-identifies S. This latter, global version of severe
parsimony turns out to be too restrictive since we are able
to show that only finite collections of functions can be
identified by globally severely parsimonious learners. On
the other hand, there are infinite collections of functions
that can be identified by severely parsimonious learners.
However, no infinite r.e. class of (total) computable functions
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3 Entia non sunt multiplicand a, prster necessitatem: attributed to the
medieval philosopher William of Occam. However, W. M. Thorburn [41]
raises some doubts as to whether William of Occam ever used the above
expression, and raises the possibility that it may have originated in the
work of Duns Scotus. According to Thorburn [42], the terminology,
Occam’s Razor, seems to have first appeared in 1852 in the work of Sir
William Hamilton. Moody [31] provides a study of the philosophy of
William of Occam. ‘Occam’ is sometimes spelled ‘Ockham’.
4 Furthermore, the presence of the computable fudge factor in nearly
minimal identification and in our new criteria below together with Blum’s
recursive relatedness result for his program size measures [8] nicely wash
out any possible dependence of these criteria on the choice of Blum
program size measure.
5 It does quite importantly model the possible goal in science of even-
tually finding parsimonious explanations.
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is identifiable by severely parsimonious machines! Sur-
prisingly, then, standard classes easily and naturally iden-
tifiable without the constraint of severe parsimony (for
example, by the enumeration technique [22, 6]) are no
longer identifiable with this constraint.
The simplicity of severely parsimonious identification
notwithstanding, it suffers from a crucial drawback as a
model of induction without paradigm shift. The following
argument illuminates this point.
There is nothing that prevents a learner from going from
a small size conjecture to a large size conjecture: The restric-
tion is due to the size of the programs conjectured in
relation to the minimal size program for the function being
learned, and not due to the sizes of the various conjectured
programs. To see this point, suppose on successive initial
segments a learner outputs a very small size program and a
very large size program. It is not clear if a paradigm shift (of
the kinds we are considering) has taken place. One cannot
be sure that such a paradigm shift has taken place since later
parts of the function may be complex enough so that the size
of minimal program for the function is huge, hiding all the
earlier differences in the conjectures. Although the global
version of severe parsimony avoids this problem, as noted
above, it turns out to be too restrictive.
To address these concerns, we introduce another
approach to modeling induction without paradigm shifts.
This new approach considers learners that, on any com-
putable function, conjecture programs which differ only
‘‘slightly’’ in size from each other. We make this idea precise
with the help of some technical machinery. Suppose M is a
learning machine and f is a computable function. Then
ProgSet(M, f ) is defined to be the collection of programs
that are output by M on any initial segment of f.
Definition 3. A learning machine M is said to be non-
revolutionary just in case there exists a computable function
h such that for each computable f,
max(ProgSet(M, f ))h(min(ProgSet(M, f ))).
In other words, the range of a non-revolutionary machine’s
conjectures on any computable function is limited in terms
of size, in fact, there is a bound on how large the largest size
conjecture can be in relation to the smallest size conjecture
and this bound is uniform across every computable function.
Definition 4. NrEx denotes the set of collections of
functions, S, such that some non-revolutionary machine
Ex-identifies each function in S.6
Clearly, non-revolutionary learners capture an interest-
ing notion of induction without paradigm shifts.
In the present paper we completely compare the power of
all criteria considered (with and without anomalies allowed
andor mind change bounds [3, 15]), and below are some
interesting highlights.
Of course we would (correctly) expect the non-
revolutionary restriction to limit learning power, i.e., we
expect and have (from Theorem 8) that (Ex&NrEx){<.
Surprisingly, though, this theorem says, moreover, that
some classes can be learned with severe parsimony, no
anomalies, and at most one mind change, which classes can-
not be learned by a non-revolutionary machine even with no
restrictions on mind changes and allowing an unbounded
finite number of anomalies in the final programs learned!
By contrast, however, we see below from the proof of
Corollary 4(a) and from Proposition 2 that NrEx, unlike
SpEx, does contain some infinite r.e. classes of (total) com-
putable functions; hence, the quite conservative non-revolu-
tionary restriction is, in some other and important cases7,
not as strongly deleterious to learning power as severe
parsimony.
Of course the non-revolutionary constraint is quite con-
servative (as is severe parsimony). Allowing, say, up to one
extra mind change toward a final program learned under
the non-revolutionary constraint is seemingly trivially
liberalone little mind change of bounded size does not
seem to make a revolution. However, by Theorem 9, some-
what surprisingly, there are classes learnable with the non-
revolutionary constraint, up to (i+1) mind changes, and
no anomalies, which classes cannot be learned with no size
constraint, an unbounded, finite number of anomalies in the
final program, but with no more than i mind changes.
Hence, in some cases, the possibility of one extra mind
change is considerably more liberating than removal of the
quite conservative non-revolutionary constraint. The proof
of this result is combinatorially interesting.
Also, we have, by Corollary 12(a), that possible anomalies,
like possible mind changes, in some cases, liberate more
learning power than permitting revolutionary shifts in
program size. This result, however, follows easily from prior
results in the literature.
Theorems 7 and 6 provide results similar to those of the
just above two paragraphs, but for the very conservative
constraint of severe parsimony.
Though this paper is mostly concerned with function
identification, the above notions have counterparts in
language identification. We would like to note that most
results carry over to the language learning context; however,
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6 It is easily seen that, were we to require instead in the definition of
NrEx that some machine M Ex-identifies each function in S, where M’s
non-revolutionary behavior is exhibited on all f # S (and not necessarily
on all computable f ), the class NrEx would be the same. Likewise, it would
be the same were we to require the non-revolutionary behavior on all f,
computable or otherwise.
7 Infinite r.e. classes of total computable functions are archetypal exam-
ples of Ex-learnable classes [22, 6] and the object of further important
study (for example, [4] regarding the complexity of their inference and
[20] regarding their alleged ubiquity in learning).
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the picture, for language learning without paradigm shift, is
more complicated for vacillatory identification [10, 13, 25].
Future work will also consider slightly less conservative
criteria in which the fudge factor functions h are allowed to
be limiting-recursive [40, 14].
We now proceed formally. Section 2 introduces the nota-
tion and preliminary notions from inductive inference
literature. Severely parsimonious identification is con-
sidered in Section 3. Non-revolutionary identification is
studied in Section 4. Section 5 deals with issues arising out
of behaviorally correct and vacillatory function learning,
each without paradigm shift. Our proofs of many of the
theorems in this paper involve complicated combinatorial
arguments.
2. NOTATION AND PRELIMINARIES
Recursion-theoretic concepts not explained below are
treated in [37]. N denotes the set of natural numbers. V
denotes a non-member of N and is assumed to satisfy
(\n)[n<V<]. We let e, i, j, k, l, m, n, p, r, s, t, x, y, and
z, with or without decorations, range over N. We let a, b, c,
and d, with or without decorations, range over N _ [V]. We
let P, S, X, with or without decorations, range over subsets
of N and we let D range over finite subsets of N. #, , /,
$, #, respectively denote membership, subset, proper
subset, superset and proper superset relations for sets.
< denotes emptyset. card(P) denotes the cardinality of P.
So then, ‘‘card(P)V’’ means that card(P) is finite. min(P)
and max(P) respectively denote the minimum and maximum
element in P. We take min(<) to be  and max(<) to
be 0.
( } , } ) denotes a 11 computable mapping from pairs of
natural numbers onto natural numbers. ?1 , ?2 are the
corresponding projection functions. ( } , } ) is extended to
n-tuples in a natural way.
’, with or without decorations, ranges over partial func-
tions. For a # N _ [V], ’1=a ’2 means that card([x | ’1(x)
{’2(x)])a. (If ’1 and ’2 are both undefined on input x,
then, as is standard, we take ’1(x)=’2(x).) domain(’) and
range(’) respectively denote the domain and range of the
partial function ’.
f, g, h, with or without decorations, range over R. C and
S, with or without decorations, range over subsets of R. 
ranges over acceptable programming systems for the partial
computable functions: N  N. i denotes the partial func-
tion computed by the ith program in the  programming
system. For the sake of brevity, we refer to the acceptable
programming system  as simply the -system. . denotes a
fixed acceptable programming system. .i denotes the
partial computable function computed by program i in
the .-system. We let 8 be an arbitrary Blum complexity
measure [7] associated with the acceptable programming
system .; such measures exist for any acceptable program-
ming system [7]. For a given partial computable function
’, we define MinProg(’) to denote min([i | .i=’]).
2.1. Function Identification in the Limit
We first describe function learning machines. We assume,
without loss of generality, that the graph of a function is fed
to a machine in canonical order. For f # R and n # N, we let
f [n] denote the finite initial segment [(x, f (x)) | x<n].
Clearly, f [0] denotes the empty segment. SEG denotes the
set of all finite initial segments, [f [n] | f # R 7 n # N ]. We
let _, with or without decorations, range over SEG.
Definition 5 [22]. A function learning machine is an
algorithmic device that computes a mapping from SEG into
N _ [?].
Intuitively, ‘‘?’’ above denotes the case when the machine
may not wish to make a conjecture. Although it is not
necessary to consider learners that issue ‘‘?’’ for identifica-
tion in the limit, it becomes useful when the number of mind
changes a learner can make is bounded. In this paper, we
assume, without loss of generality, that once a function lear-
ning machine has issued a conjecture on some initial seg-
ment of a function, it outputs a conjecture on all extensions
of that initial segment. This is without loss of generality,
because a machine wishing to emit ‘‘?’’ after making a con-
jecture can instead be thought of as repeating its old conjec-
ture. We let M, with or without decorations, range over
learning machines.
Since the set of all finite initial segments, SEG, can be
coded onto N, we can view these machines as taking natural
numbers as input and emitting natural numbers or ?’s as
output. The next definition describes function identification
in the limit. We also consider the case in which the final
program is allowed to have anomalies. Some notation
about anomalous programs is in order. Recall that for
a # N _ [V], a partial recursive function ’, and a recursive
function f, we say that ’=a f (read: ’ is an a-variant of f )
just in case card([n | ’(n){ f (n)])a. If ’(x) is defined and
’(x){ f (x), then ’ is said to be convergently different from
f at x. It is helpful to think of a program i for ’ as an
‘‘anomalous explanation’’ for f, that is, an explanation with
a finite number of anomalies (in fact,  a anomalies) in its
predictions of values of f. In this case i is referred to as an
a-error program for f. Finally, we say that M( f ) converges
to i (written: M( f ) a=i ) iff (\

n)[M( f [n])=i]; M( f ) is
undefined if no such i exists.
Definition 6 [22, 6, 15]. Let a, b # N _ [V]. Let f # R.
(a) M Exab-identifies f (written: f # Ex
a
b(M)) just in case
there exists an a-error program i for f such that M( f ) a=i
and card([n | ?{M( f [n]){M( f [n+1])])b (i.e., M
makes no more than b mind changes on f ).
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(b) M Exab-identifies S iff M Ex
a
b -identifies each f # S.
(c) Exab=[SR | (_M)[SEx
a
b(M)]].
The relationship between the above criteria is summarized
in the following theorem.
Theorem 1 [15, 6].
(a) Let b # N _ [V]. Then, Exb=Ex0b/Ex
1
b/Ex
2
b/
} } } /Exb*.
(b) Let a # N _ [V]. Then, Exa0/Ex
a
1/Ex
a
2/ } } } /
Exa
*
.
(c) (\a, b, c, d # N _ [V])[ExabEx
c
d  (ac) 7 (bd)].
2.2. Nearly Minimal Identification
Since our study of induction without paradigm shift is
intimately related to identification of succinct programs, we
next define the notion nearly minimal identification con-
sidered by Freivalds [17] and extended by Chen [16].
Definition 7 [17, 19, 16]. Let a, b # N _ [V].
(a) M MExab-identifies f, with recursive fudge factor h,
(written: f # MExab(M, h)) iff M Ex
a
b -identifies f and
M( f )h(MinProg( f )).
(b) M MExab-identifies S, iff there exists a recursive
fudge factor h such that, SMExab(M, h).
(c) MExab=[SR | (_M)[M MEx
a
b-identifies S]].
We write MEx for MEx0
*
and MExa for MExa
*
.
The following is a theorem relating MEx-identification
and Ex-identification.
Theorem 2 [16, 23]. Let a, b, c, d # N _ [V] and n # N.
Then
(a) MExabEx
c
d  (ac) 7 (bd ).
(b) Exan/MEx
a
*
.
(c) Ex00&MExn*{<.
(d) Ex0&MExn{<.
(e) Ex*=MEx*.
Before we begin our discussion of machine induction
without revolutionary paradigm shifts, we present the
following lemma which is useful in many of our diagonaliza-
tion results.
Lemma 1 [32]. There exists an r.e. sequence M0 , M1 , ...,
of learning machines such that for all criterion of identifica-
tion, I, discussed in this paper, for all S # I, there exists an i
such that SI(Mi).
The reader should note that the above lemma holds not
only for I # [Exab , MEx
a
b] but for all the other criteria
defined in the sequel. The advantage of the above lemma
is that in diagonalization arguments it suffices to show
that none of the learning machines in the sequence
M0 , M1 , M2 , ... is successful.
3. SEVERELY PARSIMONIOUS IDENTIFICATION
As noted in the introductory section, the constraint of
severe parsimony requires a learning machine to emit
programs of size within a computable ‘‘fudge’’ factor of the
minimal size program. We formalize this notion in the next
definition. In doing so we also consider the following two
modifications on the constraint of severe parsimony as
described in the introduction.
(a) Allowing the final programs to contain errors.
(b) Introducing a bound on the number of mind
changes before the onset of convergence.
Definition 8. Let a, b # N _ [V].
(a) M is severely parsimonious on SR just in case
there exists a recursive function h such that, for each f # S,
for each n # N, M( f [n])h(MinProg( f )).
(b) M is globally severely parsimonious just in case M
is severely parsimonious on R.
(c) SpExab=[SR | (_M)[M is severely par-
simonious on S and M Exab-identifies S]].
(d) gSpExab=[SR | (_M)[M is globally severely
parsimonious and M Exab-identifies S]].
Intuitively, SpExab denotes the class of sets of functions,
S, such that some machine that is severely parsimonious on
S Exab-identifies S. On the other hand gSpEx
a
b denotes the
class of sets of functions that can be identified by a globally
severely parsimonious machine. It is easy to see that for all
a, b # N _ [V],
gSpExabSpEx
a
b .
Clearly, SpEx is SpEx0
*
. Also, by SpExa we mean SpExa
*
.
We first establish the following result which shows that, if a
machine M is severely parsimonious on an r.e. collection of
functions S, then M outputs only finitely many programs
on initial sequences drawn from functions in S. This result
is used to show that gSpEx is a trivial class.
Theorem 3. Suppose S is an r.e. class of recursive
functions and M is severely parsimonious on S. Then
card([M( f [n]) | f # S 7 n # N])<.
Proof. Let S be an r.e. class of recursive functions.
Suppose by way of contradiction that M is severely par-
simonious on S and card([M( f [n]) | f # S 7 n # N])
=. Then for all i, there exists an f # S and an n # N such
that M( f [n])>i.
Let h be such that, for all f # S and n # N, M( f [n])
h(MinProg( f )). Without loss of generality we can assume
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that h is an increasing function. Now, by the implicit use of
Kleene’s recursion theorem [37], there exists an e such that
.e may be defined as follows:
begin[Definition of .e]
Search for an f # S and n # N such that M( f [n])>h(e).
[This search is possible because S is r.e. and because of
the supposition.]
If and when such an f, n are found, let .e= f.
end[Definition of .e]
It is easy to see that .e # S and for some n,
M(.e[n])>h(e), a contradiction. Thus, if M is severely
parsimonious on S, then card([M( f [n]) | f # S 7 n # N])
<. K
The construction in the just previous proof is quite like of
Blum [8] in his proof that programs in an acceptable
system can be vastly more succinct than corresponding
programs from a subrecursive system such as loop
programs [30] for the primitive recursive functions (see
also [29, 30]).
As a corollary to the above theorem we have.
Corollary 1. Suppose S is an infinite r.e. class of
recursive functions. Then, S  SpEx.
As a corollary to proof of Theorem 3 we have that, if M
is severely parsimonious on R, then range of M consists of
only finitely many conjectures. Thus,
Corollary 2. (\SR)[S # gSpEx  card(S)<].
Thus, globally parsimonious machines can Ex-identify
only finitely many functions.8 The non-global version of
severe parsimony, however, is not so restrictive since it can
potentially identify classes that are not r.e. This is the
subject of the next theorem.
Theorem 4. (_SR)[card(S)=7 S # SpEx00].
Proof. We will construct an acceptable programming
system  such that an infinite class of functions is SpEx00
identifiable in the programming system . Since the class
SpExab is acceptable programming system independent, we
have our result. Such constructions will be used in other
proofs in this paper. Freivalds was the first to use such con-
structions [17] (see also [18]).
Define  as follows.
Let 3i=.i . Note that this makes  acceptable. For j not
divisible by 3, let j be defined as follows: j (x)=j, for all
x. Let S=[j | j is not divisible by 3 and MinProg(j)=j ].
It is easy to see that S is an infinite class.
Define a machine M as follows: for n>0, M( f [n])=
f (0). It is easy to see that M witnesses S # SpEx00. K
An immediate corollary of the above two theorems
follows:
Corollary 3. gSpEx/SpEx.
Intuitively, the reason for the validity of the above
corollary is that for global parsimony one requires a
machine to be parsimonious on all initial segments; this
restricts the machine to emit only finitely many distinct con-
jectures. However, for successful SpEx-identification a
machine need not be parsimonious on all initial segments; it
needs to be parsimonious only on initial segments of func-
tions from the class being identified. This leaves open the
possibility that a machine may parsimoniously identify a
class of functions that contains no infinite r.e. class as a sub-
set. This is what is exploited in the proof of Theorem 4
above.
3.1. Severe Parsimony and Nearly Minimal Identification
Because of the results in the previous section, we only
investigate the non-global version of severe parsimony. Our
first aim is to compare the effects of altering the parameters
a and b in SpExab . This is facilitated by looking at SpEx
a
b in
relation to nearly minimal identification, that is classes
MExab . It is easy to verify that for all a, b # N _ [V],
SpExabMEx
a
b .
First, we would like to find out how does SpEx0 compare
with Ex00 . To this end it is helpful to consider the class
S0=[ f | .f (0)= f ]. It can be shown that S0 contains
an infinite r.e. class as a subset. It is also easy to see
that S0 # Ex00 . Thus, as an immediate consequence of
Theorem 1 above we have Corollary 4(a) below which says
that there are collections of functions that can be finitely
identified, but which cannot be identified in the limit
by severely parsimonious learners. Additionally, since
Freivalds [17] (see also Chen [16]) showed that
S0 # MEx0, we also get Corollary 4(b).
Corollary 4.
(a) Ex00&SpEx
0{<.
(b) MEx0&SpEx0{<.
A natural question is, if the anomalous version of severe
parsimony is considered, does Part (a) of the above
corollary still hold (i.e., is Ex00&SpEx*{<) ? To answer
this question, we introduce the following technical definition.
Definition 9. Let a # N _ [V].
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(a) A finite set D a-supports a class of recursive func-
tions S just in case, for each f # S, there exists an i # D such
that .i=a f.
(b) SR is a-supportable just in case there exists a
finite set that a-supports S.
Intuitively, D a-supports S iff, for each f # S, D contains
a program for an a-variant of f. The next corollary is a coun-
terpart of Corollary 1 for SpExa. It follows immediately
from Theorem 3.
Corollary 5. Let a # N _ [V]. Suppose S is r.e. and
not a-supportable. Then S  SpExa.
It can be shown that S0 contains r.e. classes of functions
that are not a-supportable for any a # N _ [V]. Hence, an
immediate consequence of Corollary 5 is that S0  SpExa
for any a # N _ [V]. This yields the following corollary.
Corollary 6.
(a) Ex00&SpEx*{<.
(b) MEx0&SpEx*{<.
We now consider whether Part (b) of the above corollary
can be further strengthened when mind changes are intro-
duced in the class MEx0. Also, the following proposition is
immediate.
Proposition 1. Let a # N _ [V]. MExa0SpEx
a
0 .
Note that, since SpExabMEx
a
b , it follows that
MExa0=SpEx
a
0 .
A natural question is what happens to the above proposi-
tion if we allow up to one mind change in nearly minimal
identification. That is, we would like to know, if by allowing
extra mind changes in nearly minimal identification, can we
get out of severely parsimonious identification. The answer
to this question turns out to be affirmative as implied by the
following theorem.
Theorem 5. MEx01&SpEx*{<.
Proof. We assume that M0 , M1 , M2 , ... is an r.e.
sequence of learning machines given in Lemma 1. We will
construct an acceptable programming system  and a class
C such that, with respect to this programming system, C
is in MEx01&SpEx**. (Since the inference classes MEx
0
1 and
SpEx*
*
are acceptable programming system independent,
we will have our result.)
Let C0=[ f # R | (\x)[ f (x)=MinProg( f )]].
Let C1=[ f # R | (_y>0)[ f (y)=MinProg( f )7(\x<y)
[ f (x)= f (0){ f ( y)] 7 (\x>y)[ f (x)= f ( y)]]].
Let C=C
0
 _ C
1
 .
It is easy to see that, for each acceptable programming
system , C # MEx01 .
We will now construct an acceptable programming
system  such that C  SpEx**. Our intention is to make C
0

infinite, forcing any machine which SpEx*-identifies C0 to
output arbitrarily large programs on constant functions.
This in turn will allow us to construct members of C1
diagonalizing against such machines. We now proceed for-
mally.
Let 4i=.i . Note that this makes  acceptable.
For all i, for all j, such that 42i+1< j<42i+2, for all x, let
j (x)=j.
Let Si=[j | 42i+1< j<42i+2. Note that for any i, at
least card(Si )&(4
2i+1+1) of the functions in Si are in C
0
.
This ensures that any M that witnesses C # SpEx**
must
output arbitrarily large programs on functions in
CONST=[ f | (\x)[ f (x)= f (0)]]. We will use this fact to
define j , where 42i< j<42i+1. Our intention is to use these
j to define functions in C1 diagonalizing against machines
which output arbitrarily large programs on functions in
CONST (programs j, such that 42(k, l ) < j<42(k, l) +1, will
be used to diagonalize against machine Mk , with fudge
factor .l).
Let gi denote the constant function *x . [i], i.e., for all
x, gi (x)=i.
Let Xk, l = [i > 42(k, l ) + 1 | .l (42(k, l) + 1) a 7 (_n)
[Mk(gi[n])>.l (42(k, l) +1)]].
Intuitively, Xk, l is used to collect the functions gi , such
that Mk on gi outputs a large program (a program larger
than .l (42(k, l)+1)). Note that if Mk , using recursive fudge
factor .l , witnesses that C0 # SpEx** then Xk, l must be
infinite (note that .l must be total and thus .l (42(k, l) +1) is
defined).
Fix j, such that 42(k, l) < j<42(k, l) +1. We now define j .
Let i be ( j&42(k, l)) th element in some fixed 11 recursive
enumeration of Xk, l (if no such element exists, then j is
everywhere undefined). Let n be such that Mk(gi[n])>
.l (42(k, l)+1). Let j be defined as follows: j (x)=i, if
xn; j (x)=j otherwise.
We now show that C  SpEx**
. So suppose by way of
contradiction that Mk witnesses C # SpEx**
, where the
recursive fudge factor is .l . Without loss of generality we
assume that .l is increasing. Now let us consider the func-
tions j , where 42(k, l)< j<42(k, l)+1. It is easy to see (by
the construction of these j ’s) that each of these j ’s are
total, distinct, and on each of them Mk outputs a program
larger than .l (42(k, l)+1). Also, at least one of these j ’s is
in C1 (since at most 4
2(k, l)+1 of these j ’s do not belong
to C1). This contradicts the assumption that Mk witnesses
C # SpEx** where the recursive fudge factor is .l . Thus, no
such Mk can exist and we have C  SpEx**
. K
As a corollary to the above results, we have:
Corollary 7. Suppose a, b, c, d # N _ [V]. MExab
SpExcd  (b=0) 7 (ac).
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3.2. Anomaly Hierarchy for Severe Parsimony
Using Proposition 1 and Theorem 2 we get the next result
which says that there are collections of functions that can be
severely parsimoniously identified with up to i+1 errors in
the final program, but that cannot be identified by allowing
only up to i errors in the final program.
Theorem 6. (\i # N )[SpEx i+10 &Ex
i{<].
This result yields the following anomaly hierarchy that
underscores the fact that allowing extra errors in the final
program makes larger collections of functions identifiable
by severely parsimonious machines.
Corollary 8. SpEx/SpEx1/SpEx2/ } } } /SpEx*.
3.3. Mind Changes and Severe Parsimony
We now consider bounding the number of mind changes
in severely parsimonious identification. We are able to
establish the following result which says that there are
collections of functions for which 0-error programs can be
identified by severely parsimonious learners by allowing up
to i+1 mind changes, but for which even a finite variant
program cannot be Ex-identified if up to only i mind
changes are allowed.
Theorem 7. (\i # N )[SpExi+1&Exi*{<].
Proof. We assume that M0 , M1 , M2 , ... is an r.e.
sequence of learning machines given in Lemma 1. We will
construct an acceptable programming system  and a class
C such that C # SpEx0i+1&Exi*
The construction of  will be facilitated by a recursive
function h. We will set h(0)=0. For j # N, h( j ) will denote
the beginning of the j th group of programs. Program
between h( j ) and h( j+1) will be further divided into ( j+2)
groups of (2i+3) programs. Programs between h( j ) and
h( j+1) will be used for diagonalization against machine
Mj . We now proceed formally.
Let h(0)=0, and h( j+1)=( j+2) } (2i+3)+h( j )+1.
Let h( j )=.j . This makes  an acceptable programming
system.
Below, we define k , for k such that h( j )<k<h( j+1);
these programs will be used for diagonalization against M j .
Let g be a function defined as follows:
For j # N, for kj+1, for s2i+2, let g( j, k, s)=
h( j )+1+(2i+3) } k+s. Intuitively, for a given j, g is used
to divide the programs between h( j) and h( j+1) into j+2
groups of size 2i+3 eachthe kth group consisting of
programs, g( j, k, 0), g( j, k, 1), ..., g( j, k, 2i+2). These
programs will satisfy the following properties:
(A) (\j )(\kj+1)
(\s2i+2)[g( j, k, s)(0)=j 7 g( j, k, s)(1)=k].
(B) For all j # N, for all kj+1 and for all s2i+2, if
g( j, k, s) # R, then g( j, k, s) satisfies the following properties:
(B.1) (\

x)[g( j, k, s)=s].
(B.2) (\x, x$ | 2xx$)[g( j, k, s)(x)g( j, k, s)(x$)].
Thus, for x2, g( j, k, s) is a nondecreasing function
bounded by s.
(B.3) card([g( j, k, s)(x) | x2])i+2.
Note: If g( j, k, s)  R, then it would be the case that
(\x2)[g( j, k, s)(x) A].
(C) For all j # N, for all kj+1, there exists an
s2i+2, such that g( j, k, s) # R and g( j, k, s)  Exi*(M j).
We will describe g( j, k, s) satisfying the above properties
later. However, we first show how we can construct
C # (SpEx0i+1&Exi*) using the above properties.
For each j, let kjj+1 be such that (\lj )[.l (1){kj].
Note that, by the pigeonhole principle, there exists such a
kj . This property is needed to ensure that for all f # C
(defined below), h( f (0))<MinProg( f )<h( f (0)+1).
Let C=[g( j, kj, s) | g( j, kj, s) # R 7 j # N 7 s2i+2].
It follows immediately by Property (C) above that,
C  Exi*. Also using the fact that for all f # C, h( f (0))<
MinProg( f )<h( f (0)+1) and Property (B) above, it is
easy to show that C # SpEx0i+1. To see this note that
a machine which on input f [n], for n>2, outputs
g( f (0), f (1), f (n&1)) witnesses that C # SpEx0i+1.
Fix j # N and kj+1. We now define g( j, k, s) , for
s2i+2.
begin [Definition of g( j, k, s) , for s2i+2]
1. For s2i+2, let g( j, k, s)(0)=j.
For s2i+2, let g( j, k, s)(1)=k.
(The above satisfies Property (A).)
2. For x2, let g( j, k, 0)(x)=0.
3. Search for a t>2, such that Mj (g( j, k, 0)[t]){?.
Let p=0.
4. for s=0 to i do
4.1. Define g( j, k, 2s+1) and g( j, k, 2s+2) as follows.
g( j, k, 2s+1)(x)={g( j, k, p)(x),2s+1,
if x<t;
otherwise.
g( j, k, 2s+2)(x)={g( j, k, p)(x),2s+2,
if x<t;
otherwise.
4.2. Search for p$ # [2s+1, 2s+2] and t$>t such
that Mj (g( j, k, p)[t]){Mj (g( j, k, p$)[t$]).
4.3. If and when such p$, t$ are found, let t=t$ and p=p$.
endfor
end [Definition of g( j, k, s) , for si+1]
We now show that the definition of g( j, k, s) satisfies
clauses (B) and (C) above. Properties (B.1) and (B.2) are
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immediate from the construction Step 4.1. Property (B.3)
holds since, for each si, at most one of 2s+1, 2s+2, is
placed in the range of any g( j, k, } ) (see Step 4.1).
We now show Property (C). Consider the following cases.
Case 1. Search at Step 3 does not succeed.
In this case, clearly .g( j, k, 0)  Ex i*(M j).
Case 2. All the iterations of the for loop at Step 4 ter-
minate.
In this case, for p$ as found in Step 4.2 of the last iteration
of the for loop, Mj makes at least i+1 mind changes on
g( j, k, p$) (since each iteration of the for loop forces at least
one mind change by Mj).
Case 3. In the above construction, the for loop itera-
tion with s=s$, is entered but not finished.
In this case Mj (g( j, k, 2s$+1))=Mj (g( j, k, 2s$+2)) and both
g( j, k, 2s$+1) and g( j, k, 2s$+2) are total. Thus, at least one of
g( j, k, 2s$+1) and g( j, k, 2s$+2) does not belong to Exi*(Mj).
From the above cases it follows that the construction
satisfies Property (C). K
The above theorem yields the following hierarchy with
the moral that allowing extra mind changes before the onset
of convergence makes larger collections of functions iden-
tifiable with respect to severely parsimonious identification.
Corollary 9. Let a # N _ [V]. SpExa0/SpEx
a
1/
} } } /SpExa
*
As a corollary to Theorems 6 and 7, we have
Corollary 10. Let a, b, c, d # N _ [V]. Suppose I #
[Ex, SpEx, MEx]. Then SpExabI
c
d  (ac) 7 (bd ).
4. NON-REVOLUTIONARY IDENTIFICATION
As noted in the introductory section, the notion of
severe parsimony has some drawbacks as a model for induc-
tion without paradigm shift. In particular, a severely par-
simonious learner can issue conjectures that have wide
variance in size because the only restriction on the size of the
conjectures is that they be within a computable factor of the
minimal size program for the function being learned. Now
for a function with large minimal size program (together
with a high growth computable ‘‘fudge’’ factor), the require-
ment of severe parsimony leaves the scope for conjectures to
vary greatly in size. What seems to be needed is that the
smallest size conjecture and the largest size conjecture on a
function do not vary too much. This need motivates the
notion of non-revolutionary identification.
Definition 10. Let M and f # R be given. Then
ProgSet(M, f )=[M( f [n]) | n # N 7M( f [n]){?].
Definition 11. Let a, b # N _ [V].
(a) M is non-revolutionary just in case there exists a
recursive h such that, for each f # R, max(ProgSet(M, f ))
h(min(ProgSet(M, f ))).
(b) NrExab=[S | (_M)[M is non-revolutionary and
SExab(M)]].
In the above definition we assume that h()=. This is
needed for the case when ProgSet(M, f ) is empty (thus,
when ProgSet(M, f ) is empty, the non-revolutionary con-
straint is satisfied). We consider the comparison between
Exab , MEx
a
b , SpEx
a
b and NrEx
a
b for various values of a and
b. To begin with, the following proposition immediately
follows from the definition.
Proposition 2. Exa0NrEx
a
0 .
We first consider the case when it is possible for severely
parsimonious identification to diagonalize against NrEx.
The next theorem shows that there are collections of
functions for which a severely parsimonious machine can
identify an error free program if it is allowed up to 1 mind
change, but for which even a finite variant program cannot
be identified by any non-revolutionary machine even if an
unbounded number of mind changes are allowed.
Theorem 8. SpEx01&NrEx**
{<.
Proof. We will construct an acceptable programming
system  and a class C such that C # (SpEx01&NrEx**).
Since the classes SpEx01 and NrEx**
are acceptable program-
ming system independent, we have the theorem.
Let ZERO denote the everywhere 0 function.
Let C = [ZERO] _ [ f | min([x | f (x) {0 ]) =
MinProg( f ).
It is easy to see that, for all , C # SpEx01 .
We now construct a  such that C  NrEx**.
Let g be defined as follows:
g(0)=1
g( j+1)=2 } g( j )+3
Note the card([p | g( j )<p<g( j+1)])=g( j )+2.
Let g( j )=.j . This makes  an acceptable programming
system.
Let 0=ZERO, the everywhere 0 function.
Let fp denote the function
fp(x)={0,p,
if x<p;
otherwise.
Note that for p{p$, fp{* fp$ .
For p such that p>0, and p is not in the range of g, let
p= fp .
Now, for each j, at least one of fp , g( j )<p<g( j+1),
belongs to C (since there are g( j )+2 such fp ’s and thus at
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least one of them is not computed by any  program
g( j )). It follows that C contains infinitely many fp ’s.
We now show that C  NrEx**
. Suppose by way of
contradiction that M witnesses NrEx*
*
identification
of C . Then since M witnesses NrEx**
identification of
[ZERO], there exists a z such that M(ZERO[z]){?. Let
h be an increasing function such that, for all f # R,
max(ProgSet(M, f ))h(min(ProgSet(M, f ))). It follows
that for all p>z and m>z, M( fp[m])h(M(ZERO[z])).
But there are only finitely many programs 
h(M(ZERO[z])), and infinitely many fp , such that p>z
and fp # C . Thus, M cannot Ex*-identify all fp # C . K
Note that the above proof essentially shows that any class
containing an accumulation point is not in NrEx0
*
.
As a corollary to Proposition 2 and Theorems 6 and 8 we
have the following.
Corollary 11. Supppose that I # [Ex, MEx, SpEx].
Then, IabNrEx
c
d  (b=0) 7 (ac).
We now consider cases in which there are collections of
functions that can be identified by non-revolutionary
machines but cannot be identified by other strategies intro-
duced in this paper.
As a corollary to Proposition 2 and results from the
previous sections, we have the following.
Corollary 12. Suppose n # N.
(a) NrExn+10 &Ex
n
*
{<.
(b) NrEx00&SpEx**
{<.
(c) NrEx00&MExn*{<.
Proof. Part (a) follows from the fact that Exn+10 
NrExn+10 (Proposition 2) and the fact that Ex
n+1
0 &Ex
n
*
{< (implied by Theorem 1(c).)
Part (b) follows from the fact that Ex00NrEx
0
0
(Proposition 2) and the fact that Ex00&SpEx**
{< (this is
Corollary 6(a).)
Part (c) follows from the fact that Ex00NrEx
0
0 (Propo-
sition 2) and the fact that Ex00&MExn*{< (this is
Theorem 2(c).) K
Additionally, our proof of Theorem 7 also shows that the
following result holds.
Theorem 9. NrEx0i+1&Exi*{<.
Proof. Proof of Theorem 7 actually also shows this
theorem, since the machine given in the proof of Theorem 7
to SpEx0i+1-identify C also NrEx
0
i+1-identifies C. K
As a corollary to the above theorem and Part (a) of
Corollary 12, we have the following relationship between
NrExab and Ex
c
d for various values of a, b, c, d.
Corollary 13. NrExabEx
c
d iff ac and bd.
Since for n # N and a # N _ [V], NrExanEx
a
n/MEx
a
(the latter inclusion implied by Theorem 2(b)), the only
case left to consider is NrExa
*
versus MExb
*
. The next
theorem helps settle this question; it shows that there are
collections of functions that can be identified by non-
revolutionary machines but cannot be identified in the
nearly minimal sense even if the number of errors allowed in
the final program is large but bounded. The proof is sur-
prisingly a bit complex technically.
Theorem 10. For n # N, NrEx0
*
&MExn
*
{<.
Proof. For the ease of writing the proof we show only
NrEx0&MEx0{<. The proof can be easily generalized to
prove the theorem for n>0, by using a cylindrification of
the class C defined below.
We construct an acceptable programming system  and
a class C  MEx0, such that C # NrEx0(with respect to
programming system ). Since NrEx0 is acceptable
programming system independent we have our theorem.
Let g be defined as follows:
g(0)=0
g(i+1)=g(i)+i+2
Let g(i )=.i . This makes  an acceptable programming
system.
We will be taking C=[j | j # R 7 j  range(g)].
For j not in the range of g, the following properties will be
satisfied by j :
(A) j (0)=i, where g(i )<j<g(i+1).
(B) Either j # R or (\x>0)[j (x) A].
(C) For all k, l, such that .l is total, there exist r # N and
s(k, l, r) such that g((k, l, r) )+s+1 is total but
g((k, l, r) )+s+1  MEx(Mk , .l).
It is easy to see that C # NrEx0. This is so since one can
easily construct a machine which, using Property (A), (B)
above, Ex-identifies f # C by using only the -programs
g( f (0))+1, g( f (0)) + 2, ..., g( f (0) + 1) & 1. Also by
Property (C) above, we will have that C  MEx0. Thus,
construction of j satisfying the above properties would
complete the proof.
For each k, l, by the implicit use of the parametric recur-
sion theorem [37], we now define
v .e(k, l ) (and thus g(e(k, l ))).
v functions j , where for some r # N and s(k, l, r) ,
j=g((k, l, r) )+s+1.
We will do so in such a way that Property (C) above is
satisfied. This essentially uses the idea used by Chen [16]
to show that functions of finite support cannot be MEx-
identified.
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Intuitively, e(k, l ), plays the role of e in Chen’s construc-
tion. The functions of finite support ‘‘actually needed’’ for
diagonalization are computed by programs j of the form
g((k, l, r) )+s+1.
begin [Definition of .e(k, l ) and, for all r # N and
s(k, l, r) , g((k, l, r) )+s+1]
1. For all r, s(k, l, r), let g((k, l, r) )+s+1(0)=(k, l, r) .
This ensures that Property (A) is satisfied.
2. Wait until .l (e(k, l )) a.
Let bnd=.l (e(k, l ))
3. Pick r to be so large that (k, l, r) >bnd+2.
We will use the programs g((k, l, r) )+s+1, where
s(k, l, r) , for diagonalization against MEx-identifica-
tion by Mk , using .l as the recursive bound.
4. For r${r, and s$(k, l, r$) , g((k, l, r$) )+s$+1(x) is
undefined for x>0.
5. Let g((k, l, r) )+1 be defined as follows:
g((k, l, r) )+1(x)={(k, l, r) ,0,
if x=0;
otherwise.
6. Let Cancel=<, t=0.
Let .e(k, l )(0)=(k, l, r).
for w=1 to (k, l, r) do
loop
Dovetail Steps 6.1 and 6.2 until one of them suc-
ceeds. If Step 6.1 succeeds before Step 6.2 does, if
ever, then go to Step 6.3. If Step 6.2 succeeds before
Step 6.1 does, if ever, then go to Step 6.4.
6.1. Search for pbnd such that p  Cancel, and y>t,
.p( y) a.
6.2. Search for t$>t, such that Mk(.g((k, l, r) )+w[t$])
>bnd.
6.3. If and when such a p, y in Step 6.1. is found define
g((k, l, r) )+w+1 as follows:
g((k, l, r) )+w(x), if x<y;
g((k, l, r) )+w+1(x)={.p(x)+1, if x=y;0, otherwise.
Let Cancel=Cancel _ [p].
For xy, let .e(k, l )(x)=g((k, l, r))+w+1(x).
Let t=y, as found in Step 6.1.
Go to Step 6.5.
6.4. For x<t$, let .e(k, l )(x)=g((k, l, r) )+w(x).
Let t=t$.
forever
6.5. Continue with the next iteration of the for loop.
endfor
end [Definition of .e(k, l) and, for all r # N and s(k, l, r) ,
.g((k, l, r) )+s+1]
The above construction clearly satisfies properties (A)
and (B) above. We now show that it satisfies Property (C).
So suppose k and l are given such that .l is total. Thus, Step
2 in the construction succeeds in seeing that .l (e(k, l)) a. Let
bnd, r be as defined in Steps 2 and 3 of the construction.
Clearly, the for loop can be executed at most bnd+1 times,
since the search in Step 6.1 can succeed only bnd+1 times
(after which Cancel contains all the elements bnd). Thus,
there is a last iteration of the for loop. So suppose the last
iteration of the for loop is with index value w. Now clearly,
g((k, l, r) )+w is a total function and thus a member of C. We
will show that Mk does not MEx-identify g((k, l, r) )+w ,
with the recursive fudge factor .l . We consider two cases:
Case 1. Step 6.2 succeeds finitely often. In this case
either Mk does not converge on g((k, l, r) )+w , or it con-
verges to a program bnd. However, by Step 6.1 and 6.3
all programs bnd are convergently different from
g((k, l, r) )+w or compute non-total functions.
Case 2. Step 6.2 succeeds infinitely often.
In this case clearly, .e(i, j )=g((k, l, r) )+w . However, Mk
on g((k, l, r) )+w infinitely often outputs a program >bnd=
.l (e(k, l)) (since Step 6.2 succeeds infinitely often). Thus,
Mk does not MEx-identify g((k, l, r) )+w with the recursive
fudge factor .l .
From the above cases we have that Mk does not witness
MEx identification of g((k, l, r) )+w , and thus Property (C)
above is satisfied. K
As a corollary to Theorem 10, Theorem 2 and
Corollary 12 we have
Corollary 14. NrExabMEx
c
d  (d=V) 7 (ca) 7
[(b{V) 6 (c=V)].
5. SEVERE PARSIMONY WITH Bc AND FEX
We now extend the notion of severe parsimony to
behaviorally correct identification and vacillatory iden-
tification. We first introduce these two criteria.
Definition 12 [15, 5]. Let a # N _ [V].
(a) M Bca-identifies f (written: f # Bca(M)) just in
case, (\

n)[.M( f [n])=
a f ]. We define the class Bca=
[SR | (_M)[SBca(M)]].
(b) M Fexa-identifies f (written: f # Fexa(M)) just in
case there exists a nonempty finite set D of a-error programs
for f such that for all but finitely many n, M( f [n]) # D. We
define the class Fexa=[SR | (_M)[SFexa(M)]].
The next definition adapts the notion of severe parsimony
to Bca-identification and Fexa-identification.
Definition 13. Let a # N _ [V].
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(a) SpBca=[SR | (_M)[M is severely parsimo-
nious on S and M Bca-identifies S]].
(b) SpFexa=[SR | (_M)[M is severely parsimo-
nious on S and M Fexa-identifies S]].
The following proposition is immediate.
Proposition 3. (\a # N _ [V])[SpBca=SpFexa].
The a=0 case of the following theorem can be easily
handled with a trick of Barzdin and Podenieks [5] and the
a=V case with a trick of Case and Smith [15]; however, the
proof of the other cases is non-trivial.
Theorem 11. (\a # N _ [V])[SpFexa=SpExa].
Proof. For a=V, the theorem follows using the proof of
Case and Smith [15] for Fex*=Ex* (the simulation done
in [15] maintains the size of the programs output within a
recursive factor of the maximum program output).
Now suppose a # N. Suppose M is given. We will con-
struct a machine M$ which Exa-identifies the class of func-
tions which are Fexa-identified by M. Moreover M$ will
satisfy the following property:
There exists a recursive function h such that, for any
f # R, the following two conditions are satisfied:
v max(ProgSet(M$, f ))h(max(ProgSet(M, f ))) and
v min(ProgSet(M$, f ))min(ProgSet(M, f )).
This would imply the theorem.
Intuitively, we would like to do the Case and Smith [15]
simulation of Fex-identification, except that we do patches
in a slightly different way (see details below). This would
limit the variation in program sizes.
We first define some functions useful in the definition
of M$.
Let unionpatch be a recursive function (defined implicitly
using the s-m-n theorem [37]) such that .unionpatch(S, E, k) ,
where k # N and S, E are finite subsets of N, can be defined
as follows:
.unionpatch(S, E, k)(x)
if x # E, then
Output .k(x).
else
Search for a j # S such that .j (x) a.
Output .j (x) for first such j found.
endif
End .unionpatch(S, E, j )(x).
Intuitively, .unionpatch(S, E, j ) computes the union of
programs in S, except at inputs from the set E, where it com-
putes the output based on a specific program k.
Let converr(S )=[x | (_j, j $ # S )[.j (x) a{.j $ (x) a]].
Note that if, for some f # R, for all j # S, .j=a f, then
card(converr(S ))a } card(S ).
Let upatchtwo be a recursive function (implicitly defined
using the s-m-n theorem [37]) such that .upatchtwo(S, i, k)
maybe defined as follows (we assume without loss of
generality that upatchtwo(S, i, k)max(S )):
.upatchtwo(S, i, k)
1. Search for a set E of cardinality i such that E
[x | (_j, j $ # S )[.j (x) a{.j $ (x) a]].
Note that such a set E may not exists if
card([x | (_j, j $ # S )[.j (x) a{.j $ (x) a]])<i. In that
case .upatchtwo(S, i, k)(x) A, for all x.
2. If and when such an E is found, let .upatchtwo(S, i, k)=
.unionpatch(S, E, k) .
End .upatchtwo
Intuitively, .upatchtwo(S, i, k) assumes that card(converr(S))
= i, and then just simulates .unionpatch(S, E, k) , for E,
a subset of converr(S ) of size i.
Now suppose M is given. Let M$ be defined as follows:
M$( f [m])
Let P=[M( f [m$]) | m$m].
Let S=[i # P | card([x<m | 8i (x)m7 .i (x){ f (x)])
a.
Let E=[x<n | (_j # S )[8j (x)m7 .j (x){ f (x)]].
if S=<,
then
output M$( f [m&1]) (if m=0 then output?).
else
output upatchtwo(S, card(E), p), where p is
the (least) program in S which minimizes
card([y # E | 8p( y)>m 6 .p( y){ f ( y)]).
endif
End M$( f [n])
We first show that M$ Exa-identifies every function that is
Fexa-identified by M. To see this suppose f # Fexa(M) is
given.
Let P=ProgSet(M, f ).
Let S=[ j # P | card([x | .j (x) a{ f (x)])a].
Let E=[x | (_j # S )[.j (x) a{ f (x)]].
Let p be the (least) element of S which minimizes,
card([ y # E | 8p( y) A 6 .p( y) a{ f ( y)]).
It is easy to see that M$( f ) a=upatchtwo(S, card(E ), p),
and
card([x | .upatchtwo(S, card(E ), p)(x){ f (x)])
min([card([x | .j (x){ f (x)]) | j # S])a
(since S contains an a error program for f ). Thus, M$ Exa-
identifies f.
We now show the bound on the elements of
ProgSet(M$, f ) as claimed, i.e., we show that, there
exists a recursive function h such that, for any
f # R, max(ProgSet(M$, f )) h(max(ProgSet(M, f ))) and
min(ProgSet(M$, f ))min(ProgSet(M, f )).
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Due to the fact that upatchtwo(S, i, j )max(S ), we have,
for any f # R and m # N, M$( f [m])min(ProgSet(M, f )).
Thus, min(ProgSet(M$, f ))min(ProgSet(M, f )).
Let h be a function defined as follows:
h( j )=max([upatchtwo(S, i, j $) | S[xj ]
7 ia V card(S ) 7 j $ # S.
Clearly, h is a recursive function. Moreover, for all f # R
and m # N, such that M$( f [m]){?, we have that
M$( f [m])h(max(ProgSet(M, f ))). Thus,
max(ProgSet(M$, f ))h(max(ProgSet(M, f ))).
The bound on ProgSet(M$, f ) is as claimed, and hence
the theorem follows. K
Note that Proposition 3 and the proof of Theorem 11
also work for the non-revolutionary versions of Fexa and
Bca.
6. FUTURE WORK
Besides the proposed handling of the cases of language
learning and of slightly less conservative, non-paradigm-
shifting criteria in which the fudge factor functions h are
allowed to be limiting-recursive [14], it would be interest-
ing to investigate models of paradigm shifts in relation to
massive changes in program control structure [34, 35, 38]
and to connect paradigm shifts to the need, in some cases,
for training sequences [1].
The present paper considered machine induction without
revolutionary paradigm shifts where the learning machine
was allowed to conjecture hypotheses from an acceptable
programming system. An interesting direction to consider is
a similar investigation for identification in non-standard
programming systems. This direction is likely to be par-
ticularly interesting since several non-standard program-
ming systems have been shown to be particularly suited to
identification (for example, see Wiehagen [44, 43]).
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